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Abstract 
 
The market for factoring services is characterized by the coexistence of independent companies and 
companies belonging to banking groups. While group intermediaries may be steered in their decision-
making processes by the policies of their parent company, they are likely to benefit from synergies, if 
any, with the other financial intermediaries they are connected with. 
The main advantages stem from the opportunity to streamline costs, to make the most of the experience 
gained by the individual members of the group, and to have access to greater financial resources. 
Whenever such areas of interdependence are singled out and turned to account, the group factors may 
succeed in attaining a competitive advantage over independent intermediaries. 
On the other hand, in evaluating the impact that joining a banking group may have, one needs to 
consider the level of interchangeability among the various services that may be rendered by the latter, 
the inter-relations that may emerge in the various phases of the productive process, and the 
organizational problems that may affect the banking group.  
This analysis highlights the complementariness of the factoring service with respect to other financial 
products, evaluates the likely presence of significant synergies in a few stages of the productive process 
and singles out a methodology to assess the level of cohesion of the group and the type of control 
wielded by the parent company. 
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1. Introduction1 
 
 
In recent years, the market for financial services witnessed a growth in the level of 
concentration in supply that set a limit to the number of independent intermediaries 
working in the individual countries.2 The most widespread solution to increase market 
share has been the creation of a financial group with a holding bank that coordinates the 
other intermediaries and directs their supply-oriented policies in order to make the most 
of the overall result.3 
 
The Italian factoring market is characterized by the coexistence of independent 
factoring companies and companies controlled by banking groups. While the latter may 
be steered in their decision-making by group policies, they benefit from synergies with 
the other financial intermediaries they are connected with.4 The factors belonging to a 
group may be subjected to varying levels of influence by the parent company but, 
whatever the case may be, the study of their behavior points to significant differences 
with respect to the behavior of independent intermediaries.5 
 
Statistics of the Bank of Italy on the supply of factoring services highlight a decrease in 
the number of companies controlled by banking groups in consequence of bank 
concentration processes; in any event, such a decrease is sided by an increase in the 
market share of these intermediaries (Graph 1). 
                                                 
1 This report is the outcome of the cooperative effort of the two authors. The individual parts may be 
attributed as follows: the introduction and paragraph 3.2 have been worked out by Paola Schwizer, while 
paragraphs 2, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 and the conclusions have been drafted by Gianluca Mattarocci. 
Paola Schwizer is full professor of Banking at the University of Parma. 
Gianluca Mattarocci is a Ph.D. in “Banking and Finance” at the University of Rome “Tor Vergata”. 
2 Lown C.S. et al. (2000), “The changing landscape of the financial service industry: what lies ahead”, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Policy Review, vol. 6, pp. 39-55 
3 Carretta A. (1986), “Le banche e la gestione delle attività non bancarie: alcuni profili organizzativi”, 
Banca, Impresa e Società, vol. 1, pp. 81-95. 
4 Carretta A. (1991), “Analisi del modello istituzionale del gruppo plurifunzionale: condizioni di 
dimensione per il funzionamento”, in Vanciago G. (1991) Manuale per il 1993 e oltre – scelte strategiche 
e organizzative, Edibank, Milano. 
5 Carretta A. (1998), “Effetti della formazione di aggregati bancari sul comportamento e sulle 
performance delle istituzioni finanziarie”, in Aidea (1998), Proceedings of the meeting on “Corporate 
strategies and policies”, CLUEB, Bologna 
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Graph 1 
Relevance of banking groups in the factoring market 
 
Typology of intermediaries in factoring market Markets share of factoring companies 
  
Source: Authors’ processing of Bank of Italy data 
 
The leading actors in the Italian market are often required to interact with holding banks 
and other entities belonging to a group and the prevalence of such an organizational 
solution in medium-large companies would seem to highlight the existence of 
considerable group synergies. The main advantages stem from the opportunity to 
streamline costs and to make the most of the experience gained by the individual 
members of the group, as well as from the possibility to have access to greater financial 
resources.6 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the potential synergies between factoring 
companies and other financial intermediaries set up within a group, and to assess the 
advantage of the recourse to the banking group formula for carrying out factoring 
activities. After a review of the theories proposed by the literature to warrant the 
adoption of the group structure, and the main merits and defects of such an 
organizational model (paragraph 2), the papers reviews the advantages and limits of 
being a part of a group for a factoring company (paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2). Finally, it 
proposes an analysis of the group effectiveness based on a measurement of the influence 
wielded by the parent company and the level of cohesion among members (paragraph 
3.3). 
 
 
                                                 
6Soufani K. (2002), “The decision to finance account receivables: the factoring option”, Managerial and 
Decision Economics, vol. 23, pp. 21-32.  
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2. Strengths and weaknesses of conglomerates 
 
From an organizational point of view, the conglomerate is a solution that succeeds in 
matching diversification and flexibility, since it allows working in different sectors and 
making the most of the potential synergies among members without giving rise to an 
excessively rigid corporate structure.7 A number of economic objectives are associated 
with the group setup, such as: 
¾ search for benefits resulting from the attainment of vertical8 and/or horizontal9 
integrations; 
¾ pursuit of economies of scale and/or scope;10 
¾ recourse to economies of specialization11 and/or experience;12 
¾ reduction of corporate governance costs.13 
 
In fact, the setting up of a group may be an effective solution to minimize the overall 
corporate risk through an integration with distributors or suppliers (vertical 
integrations)14 or an increase in the market share in consequence of more stable 
relations with potential competitors (horizontal integrations).15 Such an organizational 
solution permits to attain the objective of expanding the scope of corporate operations 
and reducing the volatility of the resulting profits without calling for the creation of an 
excessively rigid corporate organization. 16 
 
A conglomerate may use the available resources to minimize costs and maximize results 
through its dimensional growth and productive diversification. In fact, the decision to 
growth inside the industry (economies of scale) 17 and/or to diversify in correlated 
industries  (economies of scope) 18 allows an allocation of fixed costs on a greater 
number of products and services and, being conditions equal, an increase in the profit 
margin on individual operations.  
 
The intermediaries’ experience, their knowledge of the business and expertise represent 
distinctive factors that may determine the success of an enterprise. The creation of a 
                                                 
7 Vander Vennet R. (2002), “Cost and profit efficiency of financial conglomerates and universal banks in 
Europe”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 34, pp. 254-282. 
8 Coase R.H. (1937), “The nature of the firm”, Economica, vol. 4, pp. 386-405. 
9 Richardson G.B. (1972), “The organization of industry”, Economic Journal, vol. 82, pp. 883-896. 
10 Teece D.J. (1980), “Economies of scope and the scope of enterprise”, Journal of Economic Behavior 
and organization, vol. 1, pp. 223-247. 
11 Eccles R.J. (1981), “The quasi firm in the construction industry”, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, vol. 2, pp. 335-357. 
12Turati C. (1990), Economia ed organizzazione delle joint ventures, EGEA, Milano. 
13 Williamson O.E. (1985), The economic institutions of capitalism, Free Press, Oxford. 
14 Blois K.J. (1972), “Vertical quasi integration”, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 20, pp. 253-272. 
15 Walter I. (1999), Financial services strategies in the Euro zone, Stern Working paper, New York. 
16 Galaskiewicz J. (1985), “Interorganizational relations”, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 11, pp. 281-
304. 
17 Berger A.N. and Hannan T.H. (1998), “The efficiency cost of market power in the banking industry: a 
test of the ‘quiet life’ and related hypotheses”, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 80, pp. 454-465. 
18[ Amel D et al. (2002), Consolidation and efficiency in the financial sector: a review of the international 
evidence, Temi di discussione Banca d’Italia, no.464. 
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group allows the specialization of the resources belonging to individual divisions in the 
provision of a few services, with a potential maximization of the benefits linked to the 
exploitation of the so-called “experience curves”.19 Furthermore, the presence within a 
group of entities characterized by heterogeneous training curricula and expertise creates 
the conditions for the inner development of product and/or process innovations that 
allow making the most of the synergies among group members.20 
 
Finally, the group structure allows a reduction in the costs linked to governance 
problems that may affect enterprises working in a number of industries.21 In fact, this 
solution permits to avoid the centralization of all the decision-making processes and to 
grant autonomy to group members, providing merely for inner and outer control 
mechanisms that are likely to safeguard the interest of all the stakeholders in the 
individual enterprises.22 
 
The effectiveness of group organization depends on the ability to limit the risk of an 
uncoordinated behavior of group members and, therefore, the risk that the resulting 
flexible structure might prove inefficient being unable to make the most of the potential 
benefits. On the other hand, the extent of the resulting benefits depends on: 
¾ the level of heterogeneity of the entities involved in terms of objectives being 
pursued, which may result in a lower capability to coordinate the activity of the 
persons belonging to the group;23 
¾ the ability to create value through the best possible utilization of the 
complementary competences present within the group;24 
¾ the presence of pre-existing relations among the enterprises giving rise to the 
group that, therefore, may be handled under more advantageous inner conditions 
once the new organizational model is adopted;25 
¾ the complexity of the individual operations, which may call for a higher or 
lower level of autonomy of the enterprises belonging to the group that work in a few 
specific industries;26 
¾ the number of entities involved that, should it be too high, may give rise to 
coordination problems.27 
                                                 
19 Grandori A. and Soda G. (1995), “Inter-firm networks: antecedents, mechanisms and forms”, 
Organization Studies, vol. 16, pp.183-214. 
20 Van Lelyveld I. and Schilder A. (2003), Risk in financial conglomerates: management and supervision, 
Brooking and Warthon papers on Financial Services, London. 
21 Gradori A. (1997), “Governance structure, coordination mechanism and cognitive models”, Journal of 
Management and Governance, vol. 1, pp. 29-47. 
22 Bethel J.E. and Porter Liebeskind J. (1998), “Diversification and the legal organization of the firm”, 
Organization Science, vol. 9, pp. 49-67. 
23 Porter M. (1981), “The contributions of industrial organization to strategic management”, Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 6, pp. 609-620. 
24 Teece J. (1989), “Inter-organizational requirements of the innovation process”, Managerial and 
Decision Economics, vol. 10, pp. 35-42. 
25 Van de Ven A.H. (1976), “A framework for organizational assessment”, Academy of Management 
Review, vol. 1, pp. 64-78. 
26 Osborn R. (1950), “The relative efficiency of large, medium-sized and small business”, Accounting 
Review, vol. 25, pp. 262-273. 
27 Phillips A. (1960), “A theory of interfirm organization”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.74, 
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The joint analysis of these aspects permits to single out, in the individual cases, the 
entities to be included within the group, to evaluate the benefits resulting from the 
adoption of this organizational structure, and to determine the hierarchy of relations to 
be established in the new corporate architecture. 
 
 
 
3. Advantages and limits of belonging to a banking group for factoring companies 
 
Heterogeneous financial services may be offered having recourse to a variety of 
organizational forms and the actual choice among the various opportunities at hand 
depends on the characteristics of both the services provided and the intermediaries 
involved. A different pay-off between coordination costs and benefits resulting from the 
flexibility and the considerable ability to interact with other businesses of the sector 
may be highlighted based on the peculiar characteristics of the company taken into 
consideration.28 
 
The advantages/limits linked to a group solution may be probed into by considering the 
level of diversification of the group’s product portfolio, the possibility of maximizing 
the result and/or minimizing the costs linked to a few phases of the productive process 
and the coordination problems, if any, within the banking group. The three profiles of 
analysis being proposed are reviewed in the paragraphs below with reference to the 
factoring activity. More specifically, the factoring services and the inner processes of a 
factor are reviewed with a view to defining a model allowing the evaluation of the 
expediency of the banking group model in rendering such a service. 
 
3.1 A comparison between factoring service and other financial instruments 
 
The factor operates by buying from the selling company their invoiced credits. These 
are purchased, usually without recourse, by the factor who then will be responsible for 
all credit control, collection and sales accounting work.29 
 
Factoring is a form of asset-based lending that combines: 
 
• receivables financing;30 
• an insurance service, present in non-recourse assignments, that – in the event of 
the insolvency of the assigned debtor – rules out the factor’s right to have 
recourse against the client;31 
                                                                                                                                               
pp. 602-613. 
28 Carretta A. (1995), Il factoring, Ricerche Newfin-Università Commerciale Bocconi, Milano, pp. 43-49. 
29 Monferrà S. (2003), “Il factoring: servizi di gestione, assicurazione e finanziamento”, in Fabrizi P.L. et 
al. (edited by), Strumenti e servizi finanziari, Egea, Milano. 
30 Benvenuti M. and Gallo M. (2004), Perché le imprese ricorrono al factoring? Il caso dell’Italia, Temi 
di discussione Banca d’Italia no. 518. 
31 Bakker M.R. et al. (2004), Financing small and medium-size enterprise with factoring: global growth 
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• a managerial component represented by a series of support services that the factor 
may render to clients with a view to improving32 and/or facilitating the 
management of the customer/debtor portfolio.33 
 
A factoring agreement may attach more or less relevance to the services outlined above 
and, depending on the actual service offered to clients, a factoring agreement may be 
broken down into three macro-categories: recourse factoring (pro solvendo), non-
recourse factoring (pro soluto), and maturity factoring. 
 
Recourse assignments require the factoring company to evaluate the risk of assigned 
debtors and guarantors, if any, and the likely presence – merely as a risk-lessening 
factor – of an assignor in respect of which the company has the right of recourse in the 
case of insolvency of the assigned debtor. In the analysis of the exposures, the type of 
relationship established with debtors needs to be taken into account. The not-
notification factoring agreements do not require that the debtor be informed about the 
transfer of accounts payable to a factor and, as a rule, payment is regularly made to the 
assigner who undertakes to transfer the subsequently collected funds to the factor. On 
the other hand, the notification factoring agreements give rise to a more direct 
relationship between the factor and the assigned debtor.34 
 
The maturity factoring agreement entails no financial support since factor does not pay 
in advance respect to the natural due date of assigned credits. Under this type of 
agreement, the factor supplies merely ancillary services, and there is no financial risk 
associated with this type of relationships.35 
 
In non-recourse factoring assignments, the factor takes on the guarantee of the solvency 
of the debtors, but the contractual practice may provide for mitigating clauses that lay 
down the persistence of the assignor’s commitment in case of insolvency of the 
debtor.36 There are two types of contractual clauses that may be included in the non-
recourse assignment agreements, namely credit limits and allowances. Credit limits 
represent the maximum factor’s exposure with respect to the entire assigned portfolio, 
while allowances represent the minimum level of portfolio losses: below that level, the 
assignor is required to repay the factor. 
 
The service offered by factoring companies may prove quite heterogeneous in relation 
to the clients’ specific needs and, considering the various available financial 
instruments, it is quite hard to succeed in singling out the potential substitutes of this 
                                                                                                                                               
and its potential in eastern Europe, World Bank working paper no. 3342. 
32 Summers B. and Wilson N. (2000), “Trade credit management and the decision to use factoring: an 
empirical study”, Journal of Business, Finance & Accounting, vol. 27, pp. 37-68. 
33 Bakker M.R. and Gross A. (2004), Development of non-bank financial institutions and capital markets 
in the European Union accession countries, World Bank working paper no. 28. 
34 Udell G. (2004), Asset based finance, Commercial Finance Association, pp. 81-88. 
35 Fossati G. and Porro A. (1985), Il factoring, Giuffrè Editore, Milano, pp. 21-38. 
36 With reference to the regulations governing these clauses, which are unconscionable for the assignor, 
see Clarizia R. (2002), I contratti per il finanziamento dell’impresa. Mutuo di scopo, leasing e factoring, 
Giappichelli editore, Torino, pp. 417-558. 
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service. In view of the above, the want of substitutes would seem to rule out the risk that 
a merger of a factoring company with a banking group might have a negative impact on 
the demand for services offered by different intermediaries.37 Besides, the decision to 
build up a very diversified portfolio of financial products permits to limit the overall 
risk for the group.38 Actually, the reduction of the profits yielded by a few products 
lines offered by affiliated intermediaries may be counterbalanced by the increase in 
profits reported in other sectors39 and the overall risk exposure connected with the 
cyclic nature of the various products and/or services proves lower.40 
 
The analysis of the market dynamics of the main types of financing highlights a 
different level of complementarity of factoring schemes with respect to other products 
(graph 2).41 
 
                                                 
37 Demattè et al. (1993), Economia degli intermediari finanziari, Egea, Milano, pp. 433-532. 
38 Boyd J.H. and Graham S.L. (1998), “The profitability and risk effects of allowing bank holding 
companies to merge with other financial firms: A simulation study”, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis Quarterly Review,  vol. 12, pp. 3-20. 
39 Holmer M.R. and Zenios S.A. (1995), “The productivity of financial intermediation and the technology 
of financial product management”, Operational Research, vol. 43, pp. 970-982. 
40 Reichert A.K. and Wall L.D. (2000), “The potential for portfolio diversification in financial services”, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, vol. 85, pp. 35-51. 
41 Boczar G.E. (1976), Competition between banks and finance companies: a cross section study of 
personal loan debtors, CRC working paper. 
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Graph 2 
Yearly percentage variation in the supply of factoring and other financial services 
-50.00%
-40.00%
-30.00%
-20.00%
-10.00%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bank Fin. Bank Fin. ST MLT Bank Fin. Factoring Leasing Consume credit Other financing
 
Source: Authors’ processing of Bank of Italy data 
 
 
As regards this subject, the trend of the factoring supply differs to a significant extent 
from that of other medium-long term financial instruments, with positive effects on the 
decrease of the risk for the group.42 A more exhaustive analysis may calculate the 
factoring elasticity with respect to other financial services granted by intermediaries 
(table 1).43 
                                                 
42 Carey M. et al. (1998), “Does corporate lending by banks and finance companies differ? Evidence on 
specialization in private debt contracting”, Journal of Finance, vol. 53, pp. 845-878. 
43 Schwizer P. (1984), “I modelli istituzionali e l’assetto organizzativo”, in Ruozi R. and Carretta A. (edited 
by ), Manuale del leasing, Giuffrè, Milano. 
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Table 1 
Elasticity of the factoring service with respect to financial services 
 
 Elasticity 
Banking services -0.2748 
Leasing 1.2553 
Consumer credit -0.8730 
Other financial instruments 2.3531 
 Source: Authors’ processing of Bank of Italy data 
 
Factoring features a considerably high level of replaceability with respect to consumer 
credit services and, although to a much lower extent, even with respect to bank loans. 
On the other hand, other services that a banking group may potentially decide to offer 
(leasing or other types of financial services) prove to be complementary with respect to 
the factoring activity. 
 
In any event, the lack of any significant negative correlation between the supply of 
factoring services and the supply of other financial services makes it reasonable to state 
that the inclusion of the factoring business within the group offer may lead to an 
increase in the number of potential clients44 and an enhancement of the clients’ loyalty 
through the supply of a more comprehensive series of services.45 
 
The outcome of such an analysis should be considered merely approximate since the 
objective of increasing their clients is not the only aim pursued by intermediaries 
merging with a group. In fact, studies reported in the literature have stressed that 
financial margins have considerably different characteristics among different 
intermediaries and it is quite likely that the integration decisions are taken not only to 
maximize the volume of operations but also to stabilize the economic result attained 
over time.46 
                                                 
44 Casu B. and Girardone C. (2004), “Financial conglomeration: efficiency, productivity and strategic 
drive”, Applied Financial Economics, vol. 14, pp. 687-696. 
45 Gyongyi L. (2000), Financial conglomerates: innovation, scope economies and incentives, Birbek 
college working paper, London. 
46 Monferrà S. (1998), “Regolamentazione e intermediari finanziari non bancari: alcune evidenze sui 
differenti comportamenti aziendali”, in Carretta A. (edited by), Banche e intermediari non bancari: 
concorrenza e regolamentazione, Bancaria Editrice, Roma. 
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3.2 The factoring productive process and potential intergroup synergies  
 
The variety and complexity of the services offered under the different types of 
agreement call for a breaking up of the factoring business - having recourse, for 
instance, to Porter’s value chain approach - in relation to the link of the individual 
operations to the corporate core business.47 Therefore, the various activities may be 
classified as follows: 
¾ primary activities, which include the factoring productive process stages, from the 
acquisition of clients to the management of the relationship and any contentious 
business; 
¾ support activities, which represent the crosswise processes required to render the 
service, such as management of human and physical resources, administration and 
accounting, planning and auditing. 
 
Graph 3 highlights the individual stages of the productive process and the main inter-
relations among the primary activities. 
 
Graph 3 
 
The chain value of the factoring activity 
 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
                                                 
47 Porter M. (1987), Il vantaggio competitivo, Edizioni Comunità, Milano. 
 11 
 
3.2.1 Primary activities 
 
The management of the relationships with the controlling partners is a stage that calls 
for a review of the objectives pursued by those who have the control of the enterprise 
with a view to determining guidelines that are consistent with the expectations of the 
ownership. An excessive shareholders’ spread and the want of a clear corporate 
leadership may make it hard to plan the corporate activity48 and, as a result, it seems 
unlikely that enterprises lacking a strong control, with respect to the average for the 
sector they belong to, might succeed in reporting a good performance.49 
 
The stage of the contact with the client requires the identification of the best channels to 
provide the service, and it is quite likely that the different segments of prospective 
clients require to be handled having recourse to different contacts.50 The assignor who 
turns to a factoring company is usually a company with a commercial credit portfolio 
that is not meager and it is not likely that the factor will need to invest resources in the 
setting up of a wide network of contacts. Therefore, the intermediary’s objective is not 
the creation of an all-pervading distribution system but it is merely to single out the 
contact channel that allows meeting the client’s requirements in the most 
comprehensive manner. As a rule, the selected approach tends to privilege the physical 
rather than the telematic channel. 
 
The evaluation of the counterparties may be broken down into three stages: preliminary 
investigation, decision and payment. The preliminary investigation is carried out 
directly by the intermediary’s front office. The decision stage provides for the approval 
by the top ranking corporate officers. The payment stage involves different 
intermediary’s functions who are to bring into effect the decisions taken in the 
preceding stage. While the decision and payment stages have no peculiar features with 
respect to the same stages carried out by other financial intermediaries, the preliminary 
investigation stage entails an approach that differs to a significant extent from the one 
adopted by the other financial intermediaries. In fact, the analysis of clients is not 
restricted to those who require the factoring service (assignors) but also to those who 
are indirectly involved in the relationship (assigned debtors). Therefore, in assessing the 
operation, one needs to take into consideration not only the characteristics of the 
assignor but also those of the other persons involved, such as debtors and guarantors, if 
any, and the weight to be attached to the different persons involved will depend on the 
characteristics of the agreement that is entered into. In the case of non-recourse 
assignments, the factor needs to consider for the most part the characteristics of the 
assigned person and the guarantor, if any, while in the recourse assignments he needs to 
give more thorough consideration to the characteristics of the assigning firm since, 
                                                 
48 Schleifer A. and Vishny R. (1995), A survey of corporate governance, NBER working paper no. 5554, 
Cambridge. 
49  Becht M. et al. (2002), Corporate governance and control, NBER working paper no. 9371, 
Cambridge. 
50 Peppard J. (2000), “Customer Relationship Management (CRM) in financial services”, European 
Management Journal, vol. 18, pp. 312-327. 
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particularly when dealing with a non-notification assignment, the outcome of the 
operation may depend to a considerable extent on the latter.51 
 
The agreement is entered into in a subsequent phase, further to the formalization of the 
relationships between the factoring company and the assignors, as well as with all the 
assigned debtors if the assignment provides for a direct relationship with the latter. All 
the administrative requirements are fulfilled at this time, and the assignor is issued the 
credit limit relative to the assigned receivables calculated based on the characteristics of 
the assigned debtors’ portfolio and the type of agreements being entered into.52 
 
The management of the relationship identifies the standard operations linked to the 
drawing up of the agreement with the assignor, starting from the acquisition phase down 
to the account receivable assignment phase. The criticalities that may crop up are related 
to the management of collections and/or due dates, invoicing of the amounts, 
notification, if any, to debtors and a likely revision of the agreement.53 
  
The terms of the factoring agreement may be revised during the life of the relationship 
further to changing requirements and means of the assigned debtors and/or the assignor. 
The renewal and decision revision management phases represent a crucial time to limit 
the risk of a total loss in case of difficulties of either the assigner or the debtor and, just 
as in the case of trade credits in general, a successful management of these procedures 
may considerably limit the losses linked to the factoring activity.54 
 
The management of bad debt business represents a significant activity for a factoring 
company.55 A proper management of insolvent parties may cut down to a considerable 
extent the intermediary’s losses linked to acquired accounts receivables, particularly 
when backed up by collateral, since the starting of debt recovery procedures allows a 
fundamental reduction in the exposure upon default.56 
 
 
3.2.2 Support activities 
 
The supervision and coordination function allows a standardization of the behavior of 
all the parties working within the enterprise and represents a relevant aspect in factoring 
companies owing to the high heterogeneity of the services rendered and the 
                                                 
51 Ruozi R. and Rossignoli B. (1985), Manuale del factoring, Giuffrè Editore, Milano, pp. 31-78. 
52 Sopranzetti B.J. (1998), “The economics of factoring accounts receivables”, Journal of Economics and 
Business, vol. 50, pp. 339-359. 
53 Richardson D. (1993), “A factor in your future”, Engineering Management Journal, vol. 3, pp. 278-
280. 
54 Thorburn K.S. (2000), “Bankruptcy auctions: costs, debt recovery and firm survival”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 58, pp. 337-368. 
55 Peel M.J. et al. (1999), Late payment and credit management in the small firm sector: some empirical 
evidence, CMRC working paper, Leeds. 
56 Araten M. et al. (2004), “Measuring LGD on commercial loans: an 18-years internal study”, RMA 
Journal, vol. 86, pp. 96-103. 
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competences that characterize the individual corporate actors.57 The relevance of this 
function increases as the size of the enterprise and the complexity of the relationships 
established among the parties participating in the business increase. 
 
The proper operation of a factoring company is ensured by the presence of a 
management and internal audit function that succeeds in evaluating the propriety of the 
individual processes being implemented and in deciding the inner allocation of 
resources in relation to both the ability of the individual profit centers to create value 
and the objectives to be attained by the enterprise.58 
 
The corporate information system allows the proper generation and handling of data 
flows within the enterprise and the enhancement of the wealth of information available 
to the factoring company. The definition of an efficient system represents a sound 
decision-making support since internal data – particularly when dealing with small-
sized counterparties59 - are one of the major sources used in the process for evaluating 
clients.60 Given the high incidence of fixed costs for the setting up of the required 
structure, significant scale economies for the banking groups may be identified in that 
context.61 
 
The survival of a factoring company may not be ensured without a proper management 
of the available human resources. Just as in any other corporate context, the objectives 
pursued by that function are the maximization of the contribution of each individual to 
the attainment of the objectives pursued by the enterprise as well as the optimum use of 
the distinctive expertise of the resources within the enterprise.62 
 
The proper management of the available resources is closely linked to the presence 
within the enterprise of a structure suitable for the attainment of the objectives being 
pursued and is subordinated to the ability to manage those changes of the inner 
organizational structure that are required to adjust it to the evolution of the context. The 
evolution of the organizational structure must take into account not only changes on the 
outside of the enterprise, but also changes within the enterprise resulting from the 
availability of new physical or human resources, seeing to the definition of new internal 
setups that keep such changes into account.63 
                                                 
57 Hillyer W.H. (1939), “Four centuries of factoring”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 53, pp. 305-
311. 
58 Paape L. et al. (2003), “The relationship between internal audit function and corporate governance in 
the EU – A survey”, International Journal of Auditing, vol. 7, pp. 247-262. 
59 Berger A.N. and Udell G.F. (1995), “Relationship lending and lines of credit in small firm finance”, 
Journal of Business, vol. 68, pp. 351-381. 
60 Eslyn L.J.B. (2005), “Information monopoly and commitment in intermediary-firm relationships”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, vol. 27, pp. 5-26. 
61 Baravelli M. (2003), Strategia e organizzazione della banca, Egea, Milano, pp. 61-87. 
62 Boudreau J.W. and Ramstad P.M. (2005), “Talentship, talent segmentation and sustainability A new 
HR decision science paradigm for a new strategy definition”, Human Resource Management, vol. 44, pp. 
129-136. 
63 Lei D. et al. (1999), “Designing organization for competitive advantage: the power of unlearning and 
learning”, Organizational Dynamics, vol. 27, pp. 24-38. 
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The attainment of the objectives pursued by the company requires a proper allocation of 
the available resources with a view to maximizing the worth of the enterprise and 
enhancing the profit centers.64 In factoring companies, the treasury management does 
not allow the possibility of using any resource surplus to implement operations having 
no bearing on the factoring activity, but a proper management of the available resources 
and a planning of financial requirements represent relevant aspects even for these 
intermediaries. 
 
The existence of a factoring company gives rise to the need to comply with the legal and 
administrative requirements provided for that activity and, even if those tasks create no 
value for the company, the failure to comply with those regulations may prevent the 
attainment of the corporate objectives being pursued. The objective pursued by the 
intermediary in those activities may be identified in the search for scale economies 
allowing the intermediary to minimize the impact of the cost components that may not 
be done away with.65 
 
 
                                                 
64 Inselbag I. (1973), “Financing decisions and the theory of the firm”, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, vol. 8, pp. 763-776. 
65 Forestieri G. and Mottura P. (2004), Il sistema finanziario. Istituzioni, mercati e modelli di 
intermediazione, Egea, Milano, pp. 300-303. 
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3.2.3 The ambits of differentiation and integration with respect to the traditional 
credit activity 
 
The complex productive process that characterizes the provision of the factoring service 
lays emphasis on the strong potential synergies with other intermediaries of the group in 
respect of both the primary and the support activities resulting from the adoption of the 
organizational structure of the group. These synergies are structurally linked to the 
efficient governance of the interdependences between factoring-related processes and 
processes peculiar to other financial services. Based on their peculiar nature, they may 
be classified as follows:66  
¾ sequential synergies, whenever the provision of the service by an intermediary gives 
rise to the possibility for other members of the groups to provide additional services; 
¾ mutual synergies, that arise when symmetric exchanges of resources and/or 
information occur within the group; 
¾ generic synergies, resulting from the possibility of using common resources, 
minimizing the share of fixed costs weighing on the individual services being 
provided. 
 
In view of the above, the different phases of the productive process of a factoring 
company may be classified based on the intensity of the benefits resulting from the 
merger into the group and on the type of interdependence existing with the subjects 
belonging to the group. 
 
Table 2 
Level of synergies within the financial group for the various activities 
 
Activity Level of integration Type Activity Level of integration Type 
Min                          ▼ Max Min                           ▼ Max Relationship with 
controlling partners and 
contact with clients  
S Supervision and coordination 
 
S 
Min              ▼          Max Min                           ▼ Max Preliminary 
investigation  
R Management and internal audit  
S 
Min  ▼                   Max Min                         ▼ Max 
Resolution 
 
- Information system 
 
R 
Min  ▼                   Max Min                          ▼ Max 
Payment 
 
- Human resources 
 
R 
Min  ▼                   Max Min                          ▼ Max Relationship 
management  
- Organizational development 
 
R 
Min  ▼                   Max Min                          ▼ Max 
Renewals management 
 
- Treasury 
 
R 
Min                ▼      Max Min                ▼        Max Late payments / 
insolvency management  
R Fulfillment of law and corporate requirements  
G 
Min                ▼        Max  
 General services  
G 
 
G = Generic synergy R = Mutual synergy S = Sequential synergy 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
                                                 
66 Thompson J.D. (1967), Corporate in Action, Mc Graw Hill, New York. 
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In the phase of contact with the client, the participation in the group affords the 
opportunity of increasing prospective clients,67 since the intermediary may offer 
services even to the clients of other connected intermediaries. Besides, the possibility of 
using the same distribution network and of obtaining benefits resulting from the 
recourse to the group brand may ensure significant advantages to all the group 
members,68 particularly in the financial intermediation sector where the immaterial 
component of the services rendered to clients turns the reputation of the business into a 
fundamental asset.69 
 
Furthermore, the decision to admit a factor within a banking group may make the 
evaluation of prospective clients easier if the shared clients represent a significant part 
of the corporate portfolio of clients since the information collected by the others 
members may be used to limit the problem of the informative asymmetry that may 
characterize the factor–client relationship.70 Nonetheless, in the face of this advantage 
there are a few constraints for the members of the group who, most likely, may not use 
different evaluation methodologies for clients (borrower rating) and have the 
opportunity to differentiating their judgment merely on the basis of the peculiar 
characteristics of the individual operations (facility rating). 
 
In the collection management phase and, in particular, while managing contentious 
business, the fact of belonging to a group may give rise to a few advantages. For 
instance, legal costs may be decreased if the relationships with external lawyers are 
centralized or coordinated by the parent company in order to wield a greater contracting 
power and obtain improved economic conditions. 
 
The corporate information system may be developed and handled directly by the parent 
company based on information provided by the factoring company in order to minimize 
the overall costs involved in setting up the database.71 In any event, this may give rise to 
a few problems related to the flexibility of the system and the limited personalization of 
the system and, therefore, of the electronic procedures with respect to the characteristics 
of the factor’s processes. 
 
The centralized or, anyway, coordinated management of the personnel policies within 
the group allows an enhancement of the expertise of the individual persons, leading to 
the definition of more comprehensive career courses. 
 
As for the treasury, it may prove reasonable to delegate the provision of a few common 
services to a single subject in the group in order to avoid useless and costly duplications 
                                                 
67 Mariti P. and Smiley R.H. (1983), “Cooperative agreements and the organization of industry”, Journal 
of Industrial Economics, vol. 31, pp. 437-451. 
68 Corvi E. (1989), Il gruppo nell’economia dell’azienda industriale, Egea, Milano, pp. 131-178. 
69 Whalen G. (1997), Bank organization form and the risks of expanded activities, OCC Economics 
Working Paper. 
70 De Angeli S. (1995), “Il processo di trasformazione dell’industria bancaria”, in Scott W., Manuale di 
marketing bancario, Utet, Torino. 
71 Lang G. and Welzel P. (1998), “Technology and cost efficiency in universal banking. A ‘thick’ frontier. 
Analysis of German banking industry”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, vol. 10, pp. 63-84. 
 17 
of the resources devoted to the supply of similar services and allow an improved 
allocation of resources within the group.72 Moreover, the increase in volume of the 
operations to be managed by this subject determines an increase in costs that is lower 
than a proportional increase and, at a group level, this allows making the most of 
significant economies of scale in the provision of those services.73 Finally, further 
advantages for the treasury management may originate from the existence of a 
preferential funding channel of the factoring company - represented by the parent 
company and other banks of the group - that may turn into an advantage in terms of 
fund availability and cost and, in the final analysis, may make it easier for the factoring 
company to handle difficulties, if any. 
 
The centralization of part of the general services and compliance may allow a 
rationalization of the cost structure and give rise to significant economies, even in terms 
of experience, at a group level.74 
 
 
3.3 Evaluation of the relationships among the group members 
 
The inner structure and the typical behavior of factoring companies differ from the 
standards adopted by other financial intermediaries75 and the analysis of the suitability 
of a group structure may not be performed without taking into account the problems, if 
any, resulting from difficulties in the interaction among organizations having a different 
structure.76 Indeed, the creation of a network of enterprises presupposes the 
management of the process of integration of the various organizational units and as the 
differentiation of the individual units grows, there is an increase in the burden connected 
with the integration process.77 In fact, the scarce compatibility of the subjects involved 
and/or of the inner processes that characterize them may reduce the advantages resulting 
from this organizational setup since it may give rise to structural constraints that prevent 
the group from making the most of its synergies.78 
 
Therefore, the analysis of the group impact on the participating companies must take 
into consideration the repercussions of that structure on the intercorporate relationships 
between the parent company and the controlled companies and among the individual 
members of the group and, if at all possible, the different organizational units and/or 
                                                 
72 Bertinetti G. (2004), “La finanza dei gruppi aziendali” in Dallocchio M. and Salvi A., Finanza 
d’azienda, Egea, Milano, pp. 603-820. 
73 Anderson M.C. et al. (2003), “Are selling, general and administrative costs ‘sticky’?”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, vol. 41, pp. 47-63. 
74 Schwizer P. (1996), La diversificazione bancaria, Egea, Milano, pp. 81-102. 
75 Carretta A. (1991), “Un confronto tra banche e istituzioni finanziarie non bancarie”, in Carretta A. 
(edited by), Le istituzioni finanziarie non bancarie, Egea, Milano. 
76 Williamson O.E. (1981), “The economics of organization: the transaction cost approach”, American 
Journal of Sociology, vol. 87, pp. 548-577. 
77 Previati D. (1995), “Gli assetti organizzativi delle banche”, in Scott W., Manuale di marketing 
bancario, Utet, Torino. 
78 Jehn K.A. (1997), “A qualitative analysis of conflict types and dimension in organizational groups”, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 42, pp. 530-557. 
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tasks of the intermediaries.79 Nonetheless, the evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
adopted organizational structure must focus merely on the synergic interdependencies 
and remove from the analysis all those relationships that are established within the 
group but are unlikely to create value for participants. 
 
The evaluation of the most guarded interdependencies may be carried out by borrowing 
a few approaches proposed by the social network analysis and considering both the 
interactions among subjects belonging to the different enterprises of the group and the 
exchanges that have taken place in terms of goods/services and/or information.80 
 
The paragraph below proposes of a model of analysis of the characteristics of the group 
in contexts marked by uncertainty that permits to establish the optimum level of control 
by the parent company and to evaluate the suitability of the exchanges among the group 
members. Having defined the general guidelines, a few approaches - ingrained in the 
social network analysis studies81 - are singled out as they may be used to measure and 
monitor the level of control of the parent company and the level of interaction among 
the members of the group. The last paragraph is devoted to the presentation of a 
simplified model of analysis allowing the application of the social network analysis 
principles to the evaluation of the factor’s role in banking groups. 
 
 
3.3.1 Managing relationships between parent company and controlled 
intermediaries 
 
The study of the level of interference of the parent company in the management of its 
controlled financial intermediaries, including factoring companies, may be conducted 
taking into consideration the exchanges of information flows within the group with a 
view to identifying the subjects who carry out policy-making and/or coordination 
functions.82 Given the variety of exchange flows within a group,83 the study must focus 
on the exchanges of information in order to ascertain whether a subject participates in 
the major decision-making processes and, therefore, may actually affect the outcome of 
those processes and exert a control over the decisions of the group.84 The measures 
suggested by the relevant literature for determining the relevance of the individual 
group actors analyze the number of relationships established by the parent company 
                                                 
79 Schwizer P. (1998), “Le politiche del personale: elementi di differenziazione e di integrazione”, in 
Airoldi et al, La gestione del personale nei gruppi bancari. Strategia e pianificazione organizzativa, 
Bancaria Editrice, Milano. 
80 Zach M.H. (2000), “Researching organizational system using social network analysis”, Proceedings of 
33rd International Conference on System Sciences, Maui, Hawaii. 
81 De Canio S. et al. (2000), “The importance of organizational structure for the adoption of innovations”, 
Management Science, vol. 46, pp. 1285-1299. 
82 Zemljic B. and Hlebec V. (2005), Reliability of measures of centrality and prominence”, Social 
Networks, vol. 27, pp. 73-88. 
83 For a more comprehensive classification of the various exchange flows that may occur within a 
network, see Borgatti S.P. (2005), “Centrality and network flows”, Social Networks, vol. 27, pp. 55-71. 
84 Freeman L.C. (1977), “A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness”, Sociometry, vol. 40, pp. 
35-41. 
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either directly or indirectly with the other members of the group. These measures may 
be broken down into a number of macro-categories:85  
 
¾ subject centrality indexes; 
¾ measures of the level of proximity to decision-making centers: 
¾ indicators of the level of centrality with respect to decisions taken in the group; 
¾ level of prestige and reputation of the subject. 
 
The relevance within a group may be measured by considering the number of 
relationships established by a subject with the other group members, since the higher 
the number of subjects one is connected with, the higher the likelihood that the subject 
will succeed in influencing the decisions of the group, as expressed in the formula: 
n 
C =  ∑ ni 
                     i=1         
 
where the value of the indicator is merely given by the sum of the relationships (ni) 
established with the n subjects in the group.86 As a rule, the measures of centrality are 
standardized with respect to the maximum number of relationships that may be 
established with the various subjects, so as to obtain easy-to-read indicators. 
 
The decision-making processes in a group may be more or less complex, and the 
probability that an individual group participant might be involved in the decisions 
increases with the number of subjects involved in the decision-making process. 
Furthermore, the increase in the number of subjects involved results in a decrease in the 
relative weight of the subject within the group and, with a view to obtaining a measure 
of the relevance of the subject within the group, it may be necessary to filter the analysis 
having recourse to weighted measures for the length of the decision-making processes.87 
These approaches may be formalized as follows: 
   n     n 
    CC =  ∑  ∑ d(ni,nj) 
                     i=1  j=1    
 
where the estimate of the subjects’ centrality is given by the summation of the distances 
among the decision centers in the processes where the subject is involved (d(n i,  n j )). 
 
In complex situations, the decision-making process proves as a rule complex, and 
involves for a variety of reasons a high number of subjects. In those contexts, the 
relevance within the group is not measured by the number of relationships that have 
been established, as it is given by the capacity to participate in the highest number of 
                                                 
85 Freeman L.C. (1979), “Centrality in social networks: conceptual clarification”, Social Networks, vol. 1, 
pp. 215-239. 
86 Bavelas A. (1948), “A mathematical model for group structure”, Human organization, vol. 7, pp. 16-
30. 
87 Bavelas A. (1950), “Communication patterns in task-oriented groups”, Journal of the Acoustical 
Society of America, vol. 22, pp. 271-282 
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decisions taken by the enterprise.88  The indicators used to evaluate such a profile are 
probability indicators, such as: 
  m      
    CB =  ∑ p (ri) 
                     i=1 
 
where the relevance of the subject within the group is calculated as the summation of 
the probabilities for a subject to be involved in the m decision-making processes of the 
group ( r i) .  
 
The relevance within a group may be hardly noticeable, being linked not only to the 
actual interaction of the subject with the other members of the group, but also to the 
reputation it has gained over time. With a view to evaluating these qualitative profiles, 
the approaches proposed in the literature provide for the recourse to questionnaires 
conceived in such a way as to succeed in bringing out the opinions on the individual 
subjects belonging to the group.89 
 
All the proposed measures represent an expedient tool to probe into the inner hierarchy 
of the group, but an improved performance may be obtained having also recourse to 
information about the nature of the informative exchanges and the subject who took the 
decisions in the individual exchanges. The use of such information allows the 
construction of directional indicators to evaluate with a lower margin of error the actual 
influence of the parent company on the decisions of individual members.90 
 
The presence of a considerable centrality of the parent company identifies a scenario 
where the decisions of the group members are not independent and the parent company 
does not allow the participating firms the autonomy needed to make the best possible 
use of their distinctive expertise. An excessive influence of the parent company in the 
decisions of the individual enterprises is a drawback, particularly in very heterogeneous 
groups such as financial conglomerates, where members may only succeed in enhancing 
their distinctive competences if they enjoy a good level of autonomy.91 
 
 
3.3.2 Relationships among intermediaries belonging to a group 
 
In order to assess the impact of the creation of a group on the participating firms it 
becomes necessary to consider the level of interaction among the subjects that belong to 
the different enterprises that merged into the group.92 The ascertainment of scarce 
                                                 
88 Pitts F.R. (1979), “The medieval river trade network of Russia revisited”, Social Networks, vol. 1, pp. 
285-292. 
89 Alexander C.N. (1963), “A method of processing sociometric data”, Sociometry, vol. 26, pp. 268-269. 
90 For a review of the indicators being proposed, see Wasserman S. and Faust K. (1994), Social network 
analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 169-219. 
91 Grandori A. and Soda G. (2004), “Governing with multiple principals: an empirically-based analysis of 
capital providers’ preferences and superior governance structures”, in Gradori A. (2004), Corporate 
governance and firm organization, Oxford University Press, New York. 
92 Economides N. (1996), “The economics of network”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
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relationships among subjects belonging to different companies or the want of a 
mechanism for coordinating the decisions taken by the various members of a group does 
not allow making the most of the benefits resulting from the adoption of that 
institutional model and identifies the scenarios where the adoption of that structure is 
not the best organizational solution. 
 
Indeed, the effectiveness of a group depends on the efficiency of information sharing 
and the establishment of a network of relationships that allows members to allocate the 
available resources in the best possible manner.93 However, if there are no efficient 
connections among the various subjects in the transmission of information to other 
group members, such a structure forfeits the benefits linked to its flexibility and ability 
to adjust to changing contexts.94 Then again, the want of exchanges within the group 
prevents a proper allocation of the available resources and diminishes the benefits 
resulting from the synergies among members of the group.95 
 
The actual interrelationship among subjects belonging to different enterprises within the 
group may be evaluated taking into consideration the information exchanges among the 
subjects of the group with respect to those made with external subjects. In fact, the 
creation of a network of enterprises presupposes the need or profitability of exchanges 
among members and the presence of a considerable volume of exchanges may be taken 
as a sign of the proper operation of the group. The indicators suggested in the literature 
in order to analyze this profile take into account the average number of exchanges made 
among group members and compare it with the average number of exchanges made 
with external subjects.96 
This is expressed by the formula:   
∑
∑
=
== m
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n
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1  
where the level of cohesion (CS) is calculated as the ratio of the number of exchanges within 
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vol. 14, pp. 673-699. 
93[93] Van de Ven A.H. (1976), “A framework of organization assessment”, Academy of Management 
Review, vol. 1, pp. 64-78. 
94 Newman M.E.J. (2005), “A measure of betweeness centrality based on random walks”, Social 
Networks, vol. 27, pp. 39-54. 
95 Chung A.S. (1996), “Performance effects of cooperative strategies among investment banking firms: a 
loglinear analysis of organizational exchange networks”, Social Networks, vol. 18, pp. 121-148. 
96 Bock R.D. and Husain S.Z. (1952), “An adaptation of Holzinger’s B-coefficients for the analysis of 
sociometric data”, Sociometry, vol. 15, pp. 206-219. 
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On the other hand, different studies reported in the literature suggest that, rather than 
considering the volume of exchanges, one should analyze the probability of exchanges, 
and identify cohering groups comparing that value with the probability of making 
exchanges with the outside.97 
 
Unlike the indicators proposed to identify the level of control, the measures suggested 
to assess the effectiveness of the group structure are calculated on a relative basis and 
univocal criteria may be singled out in order to interpret the indications they supply. 
Values below the unit point to situations where there are no relevant benefits linked to 
the setting up of the group and where it is most likely that the adoption of that structure  
does not stand to reason.98 
 
Besides, more detailed studies of the characteristics of the group permit to highlight the 
types of connections existing among the members and to evaluate the ability of each 
individual participating intermediary to make the most of the benefits liked to the group. 
The analysis of this profile allows the identification of four categories of subjects:99 
 
¾ poorly integrated subjects that do not benefit from their association with the 
group; 
¾ subjects who are unilaterally linked only to a few subjects and have with them a 
limited number of exchanges; 
¾ subjects who are linked by many bilateral relationships with a high number of 
subjects within the group; 
¾ subjects linked by bijective relationships who maximize the results coming from 
the network because they have frequent direct exchanges with a few subjects in 
the group and are highly integrated with them. 
 
The intermediaries who have a high number of exchanges with other members of the 
group reap greater benefits from their group membership, but the lack of concentration 
of the exchanges with a limited set of subjects may point to a situation where the inner 
exchange processes are too disjointed and there is no efficient management of the 
exchanges within the group.100 The possibility to single out the most relevant bijective 
relationships allows a redefinition of the organizational setup excluding from the group 
the poorly integrated subject or steering those subjects towards alternative solutions that 
might allow them to exploit the benefits linked to the group. 
 
The analyses relative to the exchanges of goods or services among the different subjects 
prove more complex owing to the need to value the exchanges made among the various 
subjects moving from an approach based on the exchange frequency to a methodology 
                                                 
97 Alba R.D. (1973), “A graph theoretic definition of a sociometric clique”, Journal of Mathematical 
Sociology, vol. 3, pp. 113-126. 
98 Granovetter M.S. (1973), “The strength of weak ties”, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 78, pp. 
1360-1380. 
99 Peay E.R. (1980), “Connectedness in a general model for valued networks”, Social Networks, vol. 2, 
pp. 385-410. 
100 Ahuja G. (2000), “Collaboration networks, structural holes and innovation: a longitudinal study”, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 45, pp. 425-455. 
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based on the intensity and the value of the relationship.101 The definition of the 
equivalent value of the exchanges proves complex particularly in very integrated 
entities such as groups, and the quantification of the exchanges among financial 
intermediaries is particularly relevant since the level of immateriality of the 
good/service being exchanged is high. Nonetheless, the analysis of this profile becomes 
extremely relevant particularly when evaluating the integration existing among a few 
functions, such as the treasury, where the effectiveness of the integrated management 
may be measured only when the value of the exchanges that have been made is known. 
 
The evaluation of the group impact may become even more complex in the presence of 
a variety of relationships and exchanges that are not formalized within the group and 
that are not easily identifiable by a subject outside the enterprise. In any event, a study 
of the relationships existing within a group may not neglect the informal relationships, 
since studies dealing with a variety of industrial situations have highlighted the 
considerable relevance of this type of relationships within the enterprise102 as well as 
with outside enterprises.103 
 
Finally, the study of the intragroup relationships needs to consider the reasons, if any, of 
scarce interrelationships among the subjects of a group and evaluate whether such 
reasons may be referred to the incompatibility of the businesses involved - too far apart 
in terms of expertise, competence and characteristics of the individual intermediaries -, 
or simply to differences in the inner organizational procedures of each individual 
business.104  The presence of differences in the inner processes of the group members 
may limit the capacity to communicate and to exchange resources105 and, therefore, 
limit the possibility of maximizing the benefits resulting from intragroup synergies.106  
In the case of banking groups, significant differences may be ascertained in the overall 
inner processes linked to differences in the products/services offered to clients by the 
individual intermediaries, but it is nonetheless necessary that homogeneous procedures 
be defined for the individual phases that are subject to integration. In fact, the 
standardization of these phases allows reducing the cost of the inner coordination 
procedures that are time consuming by nature,107 in addition to being likely to increase 
the capacity to create value through the setting up of the network. 
 
                                                 
101 Yang S. and Knoke D. (2001), “Optimal connections, strength and distance in valued graphs”, Social 
Networks, vol. 23, pp. 285-295. 
102 Cross R. et al. (2002), Making invisible work visible: using social network analysis to support 
strategic collaboration, University of Virginia working paper. 
103 Williams M. (2003), Interpersonal action across organizational boundaries: threat and trust in the 
contest of social network diversity, MIT Sloan School of Management working paper, Cambridge. 
104 Milliken F.J. and Martins L.L. (1996), “Searching for common threads: understanding the multiple 
effects of diversity in organizational groups”, Academy of Management Review, vol. 21, pp. 402-433. 
105 Dougherty D. (1992), “Interpretative barriers for successful product innovation in large firms”, 
Organization Science, vol. 3, pp. 179-202. 
106 Gladstein Ancona D. and Caldwell D.F. (1992), “Demography and design: predictors of new product 
team performance”, Organization Science, vol. 3, pp. 321-341. 
107 Murray A.I. (1989), “Top management group heterogeneity and firm performance”, Strategic 
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3.4 A model of analysis to evaluate the role of a factoring company within a group 
 
A review of the literature has stressed how the analysis of the factor’s role in a banking 
group presupposes the study of the interaction arrangements within the group as well as 
the level of interaction in performing the individual corporate operations. In any event, 
when dealing with the more complex groups, it is hard to have access to detailed 
information about all the decision-making processes. This calls for the identification of 
a few proxies that prove useful for the representation of the economic relationships 
among the different companies making up the group. A few grids for the collection of 
data useful for the construction of these proxy variables are enclosed below. 
 
Firstly, it should be considered that the analysis of the intragroup interactions must take 
into account the mechanisms of control/interference that may be present within a group 
and the role of the various subjects involved. In view of the above, an initial step is to 
delve into the instruments of direct control. An analysis of the corporate governance of 
the individual group units and, in particular, the composition of the administrative 
bodies (typically, the board of directors) of the individual companies and the respective 
management committees (credit committee, etc.), allows tracing the level of relevance 
in percentage terms of the representatives of the individual intermediaries within the 
group (Table 3).108 
 
                                                 
108 Beretta S. (1990), Il controllo dei gruppi aziendali, Egea, Milano, pp. 177-193. 
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Table 3 
 
Relevant information for the evaluation of administrative boards’ and committees’ 
composition  
 
 Relevance 
of the 
parent 
company 
Relevance 
of the 
factoring 
company 
Relevance 
other 
intermediary 
(1) 
Relevance 
other 
intermediary 
(2) 
… 
Relevance 
other 
intermediary 
(n) 
Administrative boards of the 
parent company -     
Administrative boards of the 
factoring company  -    
Administrative boards of other 
intermediary (1)   -   
Administrative boards of other 
intermediary (2)    - 
... 
 
… … 
Administrative boards of other 
intermediary (n)     - 
Committee (1)      
Committee (2)     
... 
 
… … 
Committee (n)     …  
 
Secondly, with a view to obtaining a more comprehensive picture of the inner group 
relationships, even the so-called indirect control mechanisms have to be taken into 
consideration.109 The study of the financial flows and the exchanges of goods and 
services that occur within the group makes it possible to enhance the centrality of the 
individual intermediary and to identify the actual hierarchy existing within the group 
(table 4).  
                                                 
109Schwizer P. (1998), “I modelli di corporate governance negli intermediari finanziari ad azionariato 
diffuso”, in Airoldi G. and Forestieri G., Corporate governance. Analisi e prospettive del caso italiano, Etas 
Libri, Milano, pp. 344-364. 
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Table 4 
 
Evaluation scheme for the study of intra-groups transactions 
 
Parent company Factoring company 
Other financial 
intermediary of the 
group (1) 
Other financial 
intermediary of the 
group (2) 
… 
Other financial 
intermediary of the 
group (n) 
 
Value of 
goods and 
services 
exchanged 
Net 
financail 
flows 
Value of 
goods and 
services 
exchanged 
Net 
financail 
flows 
Value of 
goods and 
services 
exchanged 
Net 
financail 
flows 
Value of 
goods and 
services 
exchanged 
Net 
financail 
flows 
Value of 
goods and 
services 
exchanged 
Net 
financail 
flows 
 
Parent company 
 
- -         
 
Factoring company 
 
  - -       
 
Other financial 
intermediary of the group 
(1) 
 
    - -     
 
Other financial 
intermediary of the group 
(2) 
 
      - -   
… 
 … … 
 
Other financial 
intermediary of the group 
(n) 
 
        
… 
- - 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
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Thirdly, the high heterogeneity of the primary and secondary activities carried on by the 
factor gives rise to a different capacity to take advantage of the benefits that come with 
joining a financial group. Therefore, this calls for a further inquiry into the benefits 
obtained by the factor in the individual activities being carried on (Table 5). 
 
An analysis of the group impact needs first of all to consider to what extent the 
processes relative to an individual activity are outsourced. The assessment must be 
carried out in a differential perspective considering the likely alternatives110 and 
highlighting, merely in respect of the outsourced activities, the decisions taken in the 
selection of the counterparty to be involved in the outsourcing process. In fact, the 
failure to value the level of potential outsourcing that characterizes individual activities 
could end up jeopardizing all the activities that, owing to their intrinsic features, do not 
lend themselves to being outsourced.111 
 
The factor’s integration within the group must be assessed considering both the simple 
information flows and the material exchanges. As a result, the contact frequency must 
be dealt with separately from the numerousness of the transactions. Finally, with a view 
to getting to a comprehensive analysis of the relevance of the phenomenon for the 
individual function, it becomes necessary to probe into the dimensional characteristics 
of that function (measured, for instance, by the number of resources being used) and to 
use these information to standardize data in order to allow also a comparison among 
activities having different dimensions. 
                                                 
110 Mararo M. (1998), La struttura di gruppo nell’economia dell’impresa, Cedam, Bologna, pp. 203-256. 
111 Cf., Table 2, page 14. 
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Table 5 
 
Diagram for assessing the relationship among individual factor activities within the group 
 
Outsourced activity 
Activity Not 
outsourced 
Percentage 
outsourced 
Towards 
parent 
company 
Towards 
other 
structures of 
the group 
Towards external 
outsourcer 
Internal 
reference 
person(s) 
N° external 
reference 
persons 
Aim of 
transactions 
Contact 
frequency* 
Exchange 
frequency* 
N° employees in 
factor’s activity 
Relationship with 
controlling partners and 
contact with clients 
           
Preliminary investigation            
Resolution            
Payment            
Relationship 
management            
Renewals management            
Late payments / 
insolvency management            
Supervision and 
coordination            
Management and 
internal audit            
Information system            
Human resources            
Organizational 
development            
Treasury            
Fulfillment of law ad 
corporate requirements            
General services            
Notes: * The contact and exchange frequency must be assessed taking into account the same time frame, for instance the month 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Any analysis of the effectiveness of a group structure must take into account aspects related to the 
types of activity carried on by group members, any difference in the phases of the productive 
process that characterize individual businesses, problems linked to the adopted leadership approach, 
and difficulties in the interaction among the subjects involved in the corporate network. The 
problems linked to the differences within the enterprises involved increase in respect of groups 
made up by enterprises offering different products and/or services, such as finance conglomerates. 
 
The study of the characteristics of the services rendered by entities belonging to a financing group 
does not point to problems linked to the risk of an inner cannibalization among financial products, 
and the study of the productive process of factoring companies permits to define a hierarchy of 
primary and support activities giving rise to higher/lower synergies with the other intermediaries of 
the group. 
 
Having defined the areas of contact among the various intermediaries, one needs to probe into the 
effectiveness of the organizational structure that has been adopted. The recourse to a few social 
network analysis indicators allows ascertaining whether the level of integration/control existing in 
the individual areas coincides with the level of integration being pursued and, in case of need, it 
permits to identify areas of intervention to improve the organizational setup. 
 
The analysis of the profiles that are relevant for determining the greater or lower success of the 
merger of a factoring company with a banking group does not exhaust the problems linked to the 
adopted organizational setup. Previously published studies have shown that, in most cases, the 
corporate governance of an enterprise is likely to affect results although, so far, there are no 
empirical analyses that may prove the soundness of such a principle in the factoring market.112[112] 
 
The Italian situation, characterized by the contemporary presence of independent factoring 
companies and factoring companies belonging to banking groups, may prove a useful sample of 
analysis to probe into the relationship between corporate performance and level of the relationships 
among group members and/or type of control wielded by the parent company. Such an approach is 
likely to outgrow the standard methodologies used up to now that fail to discriminate within 
financial conglomerates the characteristics of their organizational setup and the level of integration 
among the intermediaries involved113[113] and to offer the opportunity to assess whether or not there 
is a relationship between existing synergies and results attained by the group.  
                                                 
112 Hutchinkson M. and Gul F.A. (2004), “Investment opportunity set, corporate governance practice and firm 
performance”, Journal of Corporate Governance, vol. 10, pp. 595-614. 
113 See, for instance, De Nicolò G. et al. (2004), “Bank consolidation, internationalization and conglomeration: trends 
and implications for financial risk”, Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, vol. 13, pp. 173-217. 
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